

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Jerry Dione Cranford, ) C/A No. 6:11-2791-JMC-KFM  
                        )  
                        )  
Plaintiff,         ) Plaintiff,         )  
                        )  
                        )  
vs.                     ) vs.                     )  
                        )  
                        )  
Mr. Kammerer, As Classification) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION  
Caseworker; Ms. Christel Wilson, As MCI)  
IGC,                     )  
                        )  
                        )  
Defendants.         ) Defendants.         )  
                        )

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Plaintiff, Jerry Dione Cranford (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner housed in the McCormick Correctional Institution (“MCI”) of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) in McCormick, South Carolina, proceeding *pro se* and *in forma pauperis*, files this civil action. This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) DSC for initial screening.

***PRO SE AND IN FORMA PAUPERIS REVIEW***

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 DSC, the undersigned is authorized to review *pro se* complaints and petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915A(a) requires an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” The *in forma pauperis* statute authorizes a district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). As a *pro se* litigant, Plaintiff’s pleadings are accorded liberal construction and are held to a less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. See *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (*per curiam*). However, even under this less stringent standard, a *pro se* pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dept. of Social Services*, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).

## DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings this action naming as defendants MCI's classification caseworker and inmate grievance coordinator and seeking a determination that he is entitled to 19 months of jail time credits, alleging that "without credits I am without the liberty interest of being released from the SCDC without excessive and inordinate delay." ECF No. 1, p. 7. Plaintiff has filed the action on a state prisoner complaint form, alleging that the issues he is attempting to litigate are "the denial of jailtime credits as it affects maxout date [and] denial of petition of right to redress grievances." ECF No. 1, p. 2. The action has been docketed as a claim filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.<sup>1</sup> However, "habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may

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<sup>1</sup> Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by "person(s)" acting "under color of state law." See *Jennings v. Davis*, 476 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973). The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using their badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. See *McKnight v. Rees*, 88 F.3d 417(6th Cir. 1996). In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) individual defendant(s) deprived him of a federal right, and (2) did so under color of state law. *Gomez v. Toledo*, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); see *Hall v. Quillen*, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980).

come within the literal terms of § 1983.” *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). Plaintiff does not seek monetary damages, and he does not challenge the validity of his underlying conviction, but rather challenges matters affecting the length of his sentence. Therefore, Plaintiff’s exclusive federal remedy is to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus under either 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2254.<sup>2</sup> Because Plaintiff’s § 1983 Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted by this Court, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

### **RECOMMENDATION**

Accordingly, it is recommended that the Complaint be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Plaintiff’s attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

November 17, 2011  
Greenville, South Carolina

s/ Kevin F. McDonald  
United States Magistrate Judge

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<sup>2</sup> Circuit courts are split on whether § 2241 or § 2254 is the proper statute under which a state inmate should proceed when challenging the execution of a state sentence. The majority view is that § 2254 is the exclusive vehicle for habeas corpus relief by a state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying conviction. See *White v Lambert*, 370 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds by *Hayward v. Marshall*, 603 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2010). The Fourth Circuit noted the split of authority in *Gregory v. Coleman*, No. 06-6646, 2007 WL 570522 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 2007), but does not appear to have taken a definitive stance to date. Under either § 2241 or § 2254, a petitioner must first fully exhaust his or her state remedies before filing a federal habeas petition. There is a one-year statute of limitations on 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions (contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)).

**Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation**

The petitioner is advised that he may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. **Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.** “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court  
United States District Court  
300 East Washington Street, Room 239  
Greenville, South Carolina 29601

**Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation.** 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).